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
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
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
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STUDENT REPORT

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INF TREATY
ON NATO STRATEGY

MAJOR JOSEPH H. AMEND III 88-0100

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REPORT NUMBER 88-0100

TITLE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INF TREATY ON NATO STRATEGY

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requirements for graduation.

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<p>The INF Treaty has refocused NATO attention on the longstanding concern of the applicability of the current NATO strategy. This study examines the implications of the INF Treaty on the current NATO strategy of Flexible Response. The tenets of Flexible Response include sustainability and escalation control. This study concludes that even prior to the INF Treaty, Flexible Response was not a valid strategy due to lack of sustainability and escalation control. In the absence of a valid Flexible Response Doctrine, NATO strategy reverts to Massive Retaliation. Recommendations to alleviate this situation are suggested.</p>					
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PREFACE

This project was an outgrowth of the NATO block of instruction in Course II of the Air War College Seminar Course. It was during the writing of the "NATO Paper" that the author realized that there was a gap between what the NATO allies were saying publicly and what they actually were doing. When the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty was being negotiated, the author began to wonder if the same situation was true. This project is an outgrowth of that curiosity. In the opinion of this author, the real effect of the INF Treaty lies somewhere between the "doom and gloom" of the conservatives and the "panacea" of the liberals. The purpose of this paper is to put the Treaty into proper perspective when weighed against these opposing views. By far the biggest benefactor of this research is the author and his additional insight into NATO and US/USSR relations.

The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of his advisor and sponsor, Dr. Michael Collins, ACSC/EDN. Dr. Collins' insight into the current European political and military situation was invaluable to a deeper understanding of NATO strategy.

The author also gratefully acknowledges the contributions of his wife Cindy, whose editing of the final draft and pure common sense is in large part responsible for a much more readable product.

Subject to clearance, this manuscript will be submitted to The Air Power Journal for consideration.



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Upon entry onto active duty, he was assigned to the Civil Engineering Research Division of the Air Force Weapons Laboratory. Subsequent assignments include Chief of Engineering Design, 554th Civil Engineering Squadron, Heavy Repair (RED HORSE), Osan AB, Korea; Chief of Resources and Requirements Branch, 15th Civil Engineering Squadron, Hickam AFB; and Chief of the Maintenance Programs Branch, Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineering and Services, HQ Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB, Hawaii. His most recent assignment was at the Air Force Engineering and Services Center at Tyndall AFB, Florida, where, in addition to being Executive Officer to the Commander, he was a Pavement Evaluation Team Chief, participating in pavement evaluations at 20 air force bases worldwide, including the Point Salines, Grenada, airfield during Operation "Urgent Pury."

Major Amend completed Squadron Officer School by correspondence in 1976, Air Command and Staff College by correspondence in 1980, and Air War College by seminar in 1986. Military decorations include the Air Force Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Air Force Commendation Medal, the Air Force Achievement Medal, and the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal. He is the author and/or co-author of 28 technical articles. He is a member of Phi Kappa Phi, Tau Beta Pi and Chi Epsilon Honor Fraternities, a Member of the American Society of Civil Engineers and a Registered Professional Engineer in the State of Virginia. In 1984 he was selected the National Society of Professional Engineers Air Force Military Engineer of the Year.

Major Amend is married to the former Cynthia Louise Stinnett of Clifton Forge, Virginia, and the father of two children Hank and Katie.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



Part of our College mission is distribution of the students' problem solving products to DOD sponsors and other interested agencies to enhance insight into contemporary, defense related issues. While the College has accepted this product as meeting academic requirements for graduation, the views and opinions expressed or implied are solely those of the author and should not be construed as carrying official sanction.

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REPORT NUMBER 88-0100

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR JOSEPH H. AMEND III, USAF

TITLE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INF TREATY ON NATO STRATEGY

I. Purpose: To examine the effects that the US/USSR Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty will have on current NATO strategy.

II. Problem: The INF Treaty has refocused NATO attention on two long-standing concerns: the applicability of the current NATO doctrine of Flexible Response and US - Western Europe linkage. These concerns are causing considerable strains on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

III. Discussion of Analysis: The decision to deploy the Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and the Pershing IIs was made in direct response to the Soviet deployment of the mobile SS-20 missiles; and under the dual track approach, NATO was prepared to "undeploy" these missiles if and when the Soviets would eliminate the SS-20s. From the onset, the NATO Alliance has been strictly defensive in nature and this is probably the reason for its continued resilience. The question is, and always has been, how much defense is enough? In recent years the US has developed a distaste for the reliance on nuclear weapons, preferring to maintain conventional, as well as a nuclear deterrent. This policy has put the US at odds with any of the Alliance members who would prefer to rely on

the US nuclear deterrent. With the signing of the INF Treaty, the basis for the nuclear deterrence has been eliminated, causing the Allies to question the US commitment to defend Europe. The current NATO strategy has five parts: collective action, forward defense, flexible response, sustainability, and escalation control. The two main tenets of flexible response, sustainability and escalation control, are found to be lacking - NATO does not have the war reserves to fight an extended conflict with the Soviets. Similarly, once the Soviets achieved conventional parity with NATO, escalation control was no longer assured. For these reasons, the author has concluded that flexible response was no longer valid before the INF Treaty. It is shown that the actual NATO deterrent is massive retaliation.

IV. Conclusion: The INF Treaty has refocused NATO attention on the sustainability of NATO conventional forces and their ability to control the level of conflict. In both instances these critical parts of flexible response are lacking. A concerted effort to upgrade the NATO conventional forces is required for flexible response to once again be valid. While one-to-one conventional parity with the Soviets is not possible or necessary, NATO must continue to leverage emerging technology as a force multiplier to maximize the benefits of scarce resources. Each NATO member must decide two things: what they want from NATO, and what they are willing to pay for it.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in direct response to the belligerent behavior of the Soviet Union in the period immediately following World War II and for the past 38 years, the treaty has united Western Europe and North America for the common defense of all member nations. As noted by President Harry Truman, NATO was "the first peacetime military alliance concluded by the United States since the adoption of the Constitution" (27:10). Under the treaty, an armed attack on one member is considered an armed attack against all, to be answered by such actions as are deemed necessary and appropriate (33:59).

The relationship between the United States and Western Europe with all of its political, military, and economic implications is the most important maintained by the United States, and has been the centerpiece of American foreign policy since the end of World War II (1:9). NATO has fulfilled its objectives for the past 38 years: there has been no Soviet or Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe, no successful intimidation of a Western European country, and no change of boundaries or alignments that were unfavorable to the West (11:41). In fact, the continuing resilience of NATO and its collective ability to manage without an intimidating force, such as the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact, must be a source of continuing dismay to the Soviet leaders (19:30).

It is against this backdrop that the current treaty to eliminate intermediate range ballistic missiles is cast. The decision to deploy the Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) was agreed to by NATO only after the Soviets began to deploy their SS-20 mobile missiles. Under the "dual track" approach, NATO was prepared to "undeploy" these missiles if and when the Soviets would scrap the SS-20s (31:4).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect that the US/USSR Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty will have on current NATO strategy. To accomplish this, the paper will be divided into five sections: Introduction, Current NATO Strategy, Examination of the INF Treaty, The Implications of the Treaty on NATO Strategy, and Conclusions.

Chapter Two

CURRENT NATO STRATEGY

BACKGROUND

NATO's strategic concept is political in nature, and any military capabilities organic to the Alliance are constrained to what is politically acceptable to a very diverse group of independent allies (13:1). Further complicating the issue is that most of the governments, including the United States, rule by weak majorities (21:35). In order to maintain the delicate political balance that keeps the ruling parties in power, compromise solutions are sometimes necessary.

In order to maintain a credible defense, NATO strategy must be able to deal with all of the threats that it could possibly face; it must be capable of executing the strategy if deterrence fails; and NATO must have the political and military determination to do this if the need arises (37:7). For deterrence to be effective, it must go beyond the spectre of defense to the certainty of retaliation if attacked.

NATO STRATEGY

The current NATO strategy of "Flexible Response", adopted in 1967, is contained in Military Committee document 14/3 (MC-14/3). Flexible response replaced the doctrine of "massive retaliation" that was contained in MC-14/2 (13:3). According to the former Chief of Staff of NATO's Allied Command Europe and former CINCSAC General Russell Dougherty, USAF (Retired),

There are five parts to NATO's strategic concept for deterrence and for the defense of NATO territory:
1) collective NATO action, 2) forward defense,
3) flexible response, 4) preparation for defense of indefinite duration, 5) deliberate escalation where it is in NATO interest" (13:4).

These five points provide an excellent point of reference for understanding current NATO strategy.

Collective Defense

The NATO charter stipulates that an attack on one member is considered an armed attack against all, to be answered by such actions as are deemed necessary and appropriate (33:59). Over the years this has come to mean only an attack on the territory of the Allies. The Alliance, either collectively or individually, is in no way bound to support individual members on "other matters" such as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Falklands War, the Libyan Raid, etc.

Forward Defense

Geographically, West Germany is only 225 kilometers from east to west at its narrowest point, leaving little maneuvering room for the conventional military strategy of trading ground for time in order to mount a counterattack (38:80). Realistically, NATO cannot afford to risk even a small loss of territory in the Central Region without losing its purpose for existence (39:11). Accepting this premise, NATO territory must be defended as far east as possible. The logical conclusion to this line of reasoning is the NATO concept of "forward defense". It is evident that NATO's current strategy is dictated by the geography of Western Europe.

Flexible Response

Flexible Response has always been a strategic political compromise that gives NATO great flexibility in force employment options (9:87). Using this doctrine NATO can, in theory, control the level of its response to Warsaw Pact aggression (25:8). As former NATO Commander General Alexander Haig, USA (Retired) has stated,

The current NATO strategy of flexible response is based on a balanced Triad of conventional, theater nuclear, and [external] strategic nuclear forces in which the deterrent value of each component is magnified by its relation to the other two... An aggressor would be required to face uncertainties regarding how the Alliance would respond, where it would respond, and what level of conflict might ensue" (13:7).

The US currently supplies all of the strategic nuclear forces, about two thirds of the Theater Nuclear Forces, and a sizeable portion (330,000 military personnel) of the conventional forces (43:918).

Preparation for War of Indefinite Length

NATO strategists realize that with the vast resources available to the Warsaw Pact nations, the duration of any conflict is uncertain. In order for the deterrent to be credible, NATO must be prepared and willing to engage the enemy as long as necessary. This is a logical corollary of the basic concept of flexible response.

Deliberate Escalation

NATO must also be prepared and willing to engage the enemy at a level of conflict that will terminate the conflict on terms favorable to NATO. This could involve escalating the conflict into the nuclear arena, especially in light of the balance of conventional assets and the current strategy of the Soviets (13:5). The deliberate escalation is something that many Westerners consider unthinkable, but is a fundamental tenet of "flexible response".

The NATO strategy of "flexible response" is a strategy of deterrence. But if deterrence fails, it is a framework through which NATO can respond to Warsaw Pact aggression. As articulated by General Dougherty, there are some nuances to the flexible response strategy that are not immediately perceivable, such as preparation for war of an indefinite length and deliberate escalation. They are, however, critical to its viability.

The most important part of the NATO strategy must be the resolve to back up deterrence with decisive response if the need arises. In the final analysis, it may not be so much how NATO responds, but rather the decisiveness of the response that is important. One thing is for certain; in the event of hostilities, NATO will not get a second chance (7:108).

Chapter Three

THE INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCE TREATY

On December 9, 1987 President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty. This is the first treaty ever to eliminate an entire class of weaponry (40:1). The three main points of the treaty are: 1) All US and Soviet ground launched missiles with a range between 315 and 3125 miles will be eliminated over a period of three years. 2) US inspectors will be stationed at Soviet missile sites and also are permitted to inspect missile storage facilities. The Soviets can inspect bases in West Germany, Britain, Italy, and Belgium where the US missiles are deployed. 3) The inspection system will continue for 13 years, including the time to dismantle the weapons (40:1).

WEAPONS COVERED BY THE TREATY

The INF Treaty calls for the elimination of the US Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing IIs. Of the 464 total GLCMs, about 256 are already deployed in England, Belgium, Germany, and Italy (31:5). The 108 Pershing IIs are deployed in Germany (17:30). Both of these systems have a single warhead per missile giving a total of 574 warheads to be eliminated under the terms of the Treaty.

The Soviets will eliminate 448 SS-20s. These missiles have three Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles. Also included are 112 single warhead SS-4s and 130 single warhead SS-12/22s & SS-23s (17:30). The total number of Soviet warheads to be eliminated is 1586.

WEAPONS NOT COVERED BY THE TREATY

Intermediate range weapons systems that are not included are: manned aircraft, Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs), all British and French nuclear weapons, regardless of range, and the 100 "dual key" Pershing 1A missiles in West Germany (43:916,917). However, it appears that the Germans will eliminate the Pershing 1As, not

as part of the INF accord, but rather as a unilateral action (17:30).

The INF Treaty reductions represent about two percent of the US and Soviet nuclear weapons (43:915). Table 1 is a compilation of the post-INF Theater nuclear assets for NATO.

The Treaty represents an "opportunity to excel" for the NATO Alliance; but on the other hand, many long-standing divisions could surface again. It is up to the Alliance as a whole to collectively determine the best way to approach the Treaty.

<u>Type</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>NATO¹</u>	<u>British² /French</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bombs ³	1400	300	714	2414
Depth Charges	150	50	212	412
SRBM ⁴	320	380	120	82
203mm artillery	500	400	0	900
155mm artillery	600	150	0	750
SLBM	0 ⁵	0	304	304
IRBM	0 ⁶	0 ⁷	18	18
Total	2970	1280	1368	5718

NOTES:

1. US nuclear warheads made available to other NATO countries for use on non-US delivery systems operated by other NATO countries.
2. Assets under British and French control.
3. Nuclear bombs carried on various US and NATO aircraft.
4. Short Range Ballistic Missiles. (SRBMs)
5. Approximately 400 US SLBMs allocated to Theatre General Strike Plan. (Not considered as part of Theater Nuclear Forces by the author.)
6. Eliminated by INF Treaty.
7. 100 Pershing 1As (US warheads, German launchers) not included, but scheduled for elimination.

Table 1. Theater Nuclear Warheads in Post-INF Europe
(43:915,916,918)

Chapter Four

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INF TREATY ON NATO STRATEGY

BACKGROUND

The INF Treaty has not only been widely touted as a victory for the Reagan Administration's "hard line" negotiating philosophy - deployment of the GLCM and Pershing II, refusal to negotiate on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and the Soviets meeting the US terms - but also a setback for NATO, depending on who is speaking (20:160). As with all treaties, both sides saw their gains as outweighing their losses. Listed below are some of the principle advantages of the Treaty for both the US and USSR.

The INF Treaty is in complete agreement with President Reagan's national security strategy as stated in his National Security Strategy of the United States:

The Principle objectives which support our national interests are: ...To reduce over the long term our reliance on nuclear weapons by strengthening our conventional forces, pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, and developing technologies for strategic defense. (12:3)

The President also believes that offensive ballistic missiles are the most threatening weapons in our inventory - short travel time, no present defense measures available - and to reduce them equitably and bilaterally will make the world safer (48:6).

The Administration is also facing statutory budget cuts mandated by the Graham, Rudman, and Hollings Budget Act, and any reductions in "big ticket" defense items will help. The INF Treaty has negated the materiel and manpower costs associated with the deployment of the final 200 GLCMs.

Since November of 1986, President Reagan has been bogged down in the Iran-Contra controversy that climaxed in the summer of 1987 with the Congressional hearings. This first ever

Treaty to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons (40:1). has finally pushed the Iran-Contra affair to the back page.

At first it may seem surprising that the Soviets have negotiated away a class of weapons in which they have clear superiority (14:3). Apparently they have concluded that the INF Treaty will serve its long-term goals in Europe. First, the Pershing IIs have the range to strike targets in the Soviet Union up to Moscow, and its high accuracy gave the US a genuine hard target kill capability, putting the Soviet leadership at risk (51:10A). This fact, compounded by the mobility of the GLCM and Pershing II launchers, no doubt was also a significant factor in their decision to negotiate the INF Treaty. Second, the Soviets seek to decouple the US from Europe and expand their direct influence in Western Europe (4:1), while preventing any of the Allies from taking up the slack (15:3). And third, the Soviets seek to weaken NATO defenses and denuclearize Europe (20:160) - an objective for the past 30 years (8:19).

There are several underlying reasons for the Soviet approach: Soviet conventional strategy is remarkably similar to the German "Blitzkrieg" of World War II and emphasizes concentration of forces to break through the defensive line (18:84). This concentration of forces makes them susceptible to battlefield interdiction by nuclear weapons. In one respect, battlefield nuclear weapons favor the defender, because the defender would not have to maneuver through the areas attacked by these weapons. Recent Soviet military writings also indicate a shift away from the use of nuclear weapons in Europe to more of a reliance on conventional weapons (20:160).

But perhaps the overriding reason for negotiating the INF Treaty is that the Soviet economy is on "empty". It has been estimated that the Soviets spend 15-17% of their Gross National Product (GNP) on defense (41:48). By contrast, for the past 13 years, the US has spent about 5% of our GNP on defense (47:8). The Soviet leadership is finally having to come to grips with the rising expectations of the people. For Mr. Gorbachev's "perestroika" to work, some of the capital that has traditionally gone to the military must be redirected into the domestic sector. The INF Treaty will make it easier to divert the money into the domestic side of the economy without sacrificing any of their numerically superior conventional forces.

NATO REACTION TO THE INF TREATY

By the time that Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty on December 9, 1987, all of the 16 NATO governments expressed complete support for the agreement. Additionally, European public support for the Treaty is "overwhelming" (10:3). Despite the recent show of support, there is an impressive list of Americans that have publicly expressed reservations about the Treaty. They include Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon, former NATO Commanders General Alexander Haig and General Bernard Rogers, Brent Scowcroft, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and Representative Jack Kemp among others. Also included in this list are prominent Democrats such as former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Representative Les Aspin and Senator Sam Nunn. They all feel that the Treaty would leave NATO "at risk" (50:9).

Despite the reservations expressed by various NATO governmental leaders, there remains very little European domestic political support for the US INF missiles being stationed in Europe (28:57). Most political leaders, however, had to work very hard to gain public acceptance to initially deploy the missiles. Removing them now appears to be a repudiation of the previous policy (46:33). In actuality, the dual track decision to deploy the GLCMs and Pershing IIs was in direct response to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20s. NATO has continually stated that if the SS-20s were removed, they would remove the GLCMs and Pershing IIs (26:31).

The Soviets apparently misjudged public sentiment. They had hoped that a groundswell of public protest would force cancellation of the INF deployment. Once they realized this was not going to materialize, their position began to soften. The breakthrough came when Mr. Gorbachev assumed control of the Communist Party Central Committee. Based on his revised priorities, most notably "perestroika", the present accommodation with the US is now in their national interest.

It has been observed that the potential drawbacks of the INF Treaty are political rather than military (30:3). One of the most troublesome political issues facing Western Europe is US "linkage" - the US commitment to defend NATO Europe with our nuclear arsenal. Since taking office, President Reagan has continued to reaffirm the US commitment to NATO. In his words, "the commitment to NATO remains unshakable" and points to our 330,000 troops and our "steadfast nuclear guarantee to underscore this policy" (44:3).

In the European's eyes one of the advantages of US ground based nuclear systems is they cannot be readily evacuated from

Europe as aircraft or submarines can, coupling these weapons to Europe. If the Soviets were overrunning West Germany, NATO would be forced into a "use them or lose them" situation. The European dilemma is that the end result of the INF treaty is completely at odds with the idea that nuclear weapons are necessary for the defense of Europe (42:10).

What is misunderstood is that the basic coupling of the US and Europe is developed in the North Atlantic Treaty and is a mutual commitment to defend each other, and not just a US pledge of European security (14:3). This fact is frequently overlooked when the Western Europeans are lamenting over the loss of the US-Europe linkage.

Exacerbating the European linkage concerns is the President's strong stand on the development and deployment of SDI. When taken together with the INF Treaty and Secretary of Defense Carlucci's recent warning that US military contributions to NATO may level off or decrease (5:1), it should be no surprise that the Europeans are concerned about US withdrawal back to North America. The overall impression is that Europe can no longer count on the US when fundamental European interests are at stake (42:10). However, from the US point of view, this is like the Europeans "having their cake and eating it too." As previously discussed, Europeans continue to insist on a purely European view of world affairs and try to insist that the US adopt the same view.

Mr. Michael Gordon has observed that the fear of decoupling appears to be a concern among European national security elites and not the general public (20:175). What is needed is a realistic assessment of what each country expects from NATO and what each country is prepared to contribute to achieve their goals.

EFFECT OF THE INF TREATY ON NATO STRATEGY

It is against this backdrop of trans-Atlantic concern that the INF treaty is cast. In order to fully assess the effect of the Treaty on current NATO strategy, several separate but related issues must be examined: the Flexible Response Doctrine itself, conventional forces, the current Soviet situation, and post-INF NATO.

Flexible Response

General Dougherty has stated that the doctrine of flexible response does not "envision any unprovoked offensive use of NATO's political or military capabilities for aggression. The

primary objective of NATO's collective strength, including its military forces is as deterrence"(13:3). The fact that NATO is a defensive alliance is probably responsible for its longevity. As a defensive alliance, capabilities over and above those required for collective defense are not needed. The question has always been, and still is, how much defense is enough?

In assessing the current viability of Flexible Response, one must return to General Dougherty's five principals of NATO's strategic concept that were discussed in Chapter Two, specifically, preparation of war of indefinite duration and, deliberate escalation.

For conventional forces, sustainability is critical for preparation for war of indefinite duration. It is estimated that NATO has enough ammunition on hand for less than 30 days of combat under a full scale Soviet attack, as compared to about 60 days for the Warsaw Pact (3:3). This fact cannot be laid to blame entirely on the Western Europeans, because the Reagan Administration's defense priority of increasing the Navy by 25% to 600 ships is being accomplished at the expense of the European ground forces (23:14). If the conventional war effort cannot be sustained, escalation into the nuclear arena or capitulation are the only choices. From a sustainability standpoint, NATO is not prepared to fight a protracted ground war.

The other key area in which NATO is lacking is escalation control. Escalation control works as long as there is rough parity of the opposing forces, but once the Soviets achieved numerical superiority in the conventional and nuclear forces, they have denied escalation control to NATO (13:5). Without escalation control, it is very conceivable that in order to attempt to terminate the conflict, NATO may be forced to escalate into the nuclear arena. Colin Gray has stated: "NATO has continued to rely on a strategy that doesn't downgrade the risk of uncertainty of the nuclear threat, even though it cannot face, let alone talk honestly in public, the military implications of the structure of the threat" (22:13).

Given the lack of sustainability and loss of escalation dominance, flexible response is currently not a viable NATO doctrine. However, the previous strategy of massive retaliation still seems to be intact. In the massive retaliation strategy, deterrence is based on the certainly of a nuclear response to Soviet aggression. France has traditionally envisioned an earlier first use of the nuclear weapons during an East-West conflict than other NATO members (16:15). This doctrinal split was largely responsible for France leaving the military part of

NATO when the flexible response doctrine was adopted in the mid-1960s (13:3).

Flexible Response is unaffected by the INF Treaty. It was no longer viable when NATO lost escalation control to the Soviets. If flexible response is no longer valid, why haven't the Soviets attacked? The answer lies in deterrence and the certainty that a Soviet attack will end up as a nuclear exchange. Like it or not, "massive retaliation" is alive and well in NATO. This could explain much of the recent French activity in the European military arena. In essence, NATO has defaulted to the French strategy by not maintaining a viable Flexible Response Doctrine.

Conventional Forces

At the heart of the flexible response discussion is the status of NATO conventional forces. It is here that NATO lacks the sustainability and escalation control. But even after the Soviets have gained a distinct numerical advantage across the spectrum of conventional forces, the Europeans have opted to cling to the hope that the threat of nuclear war can substitute for NATO conventional weakness (22:13). Carrying this argument to its extreme, some leaders favor deliberate local deficiencies in NATO defenses to closer link the US nuclear forces (22:12). This "tripwire defense" sends a dangerous message to the Soviets that NATO may prefer to lose gracefully rather than to try and fight a losing battle (21:33).

There are several implications to this low nuclear threshold philosophy. First, by putting all of their faith in nuclear deterrence, the Europeans have found an excuse for not supporting the conventional force upgrade; hence the present alarm over decoupling. Up to now the US INF deterrent has been sufficient in the European eyes, but after the INF Treaty, the very weapons that these Europeans have based their low nuclear threshold deterrence on will no longer be present.

There are, however, some encouraging signs in the conventional arena. The current move to leverage emerging technologies to act as a force multiplier is especially evident in the emerging Follow-On Force Attack (POFA) doctrine. POFA has sought to revitalize NATO conventional forces and it offers a viable plan for the forward defense of Western Europe.

POFA is concerned with attritting the heavy and continual reinforcement necessary to maintain the momentum of the Soviet attack (18:22), and is specifically designed to offset the fundamental Soviet theater strategy of mass echelonment (18:84). POFA takes the war to the attacker by attacking the

reinforcements on enemy soil. If the reinforcements are attrited, the attack cannot be maintained. These tactics and the ability to execute them in a war are of considerable deterrent value against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.

The US has developed a distaste for the reliance on nuclear weapons, preferring to develop conventional parity as a deterrent (35:40). This has put the US at odds with many of the Alliance members who have preferred to forgo the conventional force upgrades and rely exclusively on the US nuclear deterrent (35:40). From the preceding discussion, it should be realized that both conventional and nuclear forces are part of the deterrence equation. As Jean-Pierre Bechten, Secretary of the French Parliament, has observed, "How long can 320 million Europeans continue to ask 240 million Americans to defend us against 280 million Soviets" (6:45)?

Current Soviet Situation

For all of NATO's problems, those facing the Soviets are just as serious. Current NATO thinking envisions either a sudden massive Soviet armor attack or Soviet intimidation based on conventional forces (10:7). Fortunately there are several drawbacks to this scenario that work to the Soviet's distinct disadvantage.

First, Moscow can no longer count on the Western European Communist Party's assistance (10:7). In fact, during a recent debate, the French Socialist party accused the West Germans of being "too soft" on the Soviets (36:5-39). As Western Europe has continued to prosper under capitalism, there is less and less reason to voluntarily embrace Communism.

Second, there are shifting loyalties within the Warsaw Pact (10:7). In the past 33 years, the Soviets have forcibly put down insurrections in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and were instrumental in the Polish crackdown in 1980. There is an obvious barrier to genuine cooperation when alliances are based on coercion and intimidation, rather than the genuine desire for collective defense.

Third, the Soviets have always had difficulty in transforming numerical superiority into battlefield advantage (10:7). In fact, London's Institute for Strategic Studies has recently reworked their force comparison between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to deemphasize the straight numerical comparisons and to try and account for "other factors" (12:7).

Finally, previous attempts at intimidation have failed due to the cohesiveness of NATO (10:7). In many cases, Soviet attempts have only served to increase NATO solidarity.

Post-INF Europe

There are numerous options being considered on how to fill the void left by the elimination of the INF forces: modernization of the entire theater nuclear arsenal (34:1), improving nuclear capable aircraft (5:1), more SLCMs to NATO (32:6), and modify the B-52Gs and give them a conventional mission (24:1), to name just a few. Many of these options were also being considered prior to the Treaty as part of the overall NATO upgrade program. But by far the most effective improvement will be to upgrade the conventional forces to the point of being able to deny the Soviets a quick, cheap victory in Europe. The spectre of a stalled Soviet invasion some miles inside of West Germany and its effect on the rest of the Warsaw Pact and China is probably as powerful a deterrent as the US nuclear arsenal.

One of the benefits of the INF Treaty is that it has touched off a flurry of bilateral and multilateral intra-European cooperation, most of which is within the Western European Union (WEU). While the US initially had reservations about this cooperation, it now fully supports these initiatives (29:2). This new dialog has even reached the point that the English and French are talking publicly about a joint nuclear weapons development program to make up for the withdrawal of the US INF assets (2:3).

However, these intra-European talks have had some unexpected side effects. Turkey and other Southern Flank countries have expressed concern that the WEU defense initiatives would lessen the NATO commitment to Turkey and the entire Southern Flank (49:5). This attitude is somewhat surprising since Turkey has recently refused a NATO request to station Short Range Cruise Missiles and upgraded Lance Missiles in Turkey because they did not want to antagonize the Soviets (45:4). In this case, the Turkish Government must decide: first, what they want from NATO, and second, what they are willing to contribute to NATO to attain this goal.

Chapter Five

CONCLUSIONS

The initial decision to deploy the GLCMs and Pershing IIs was in direct response to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20s, and under the dual track approach, NATO was prepared to "undeploy" these missiles if the Soviets would eliminate the SS-20s. The NATO objective has been accomplished; if the INF Treaty is ratified by the US Senate, the Soviet SS-20s and the US GLCMs and Pershing IIs will be removed. Some Europeans perceive that the removal of the INF missiles signals a lessening of the US commitment to defend Europe. From the US perspective, this is hard to understand, especially since the removal of these missiles was directly linked to the removal of the SS-20s.

This difference stems from the basis of deterrence. The Europeans have put more emphasis on the US nuclear deterrence, while neglecting the conventional forces. With the INF missiles gone, there is little basis for a European deterrence model based solely on nuclear weapons. The US has emphasized both the nuclear and conventional deterrence rather than completely putting their trust in nuclear weapons that may or may not ever be used. These differing approaches to deterrence must be resolved in order to prevent further deterioration of the Alliance.

From the preceding discussion, it is evident that the INF Treaty will not greatly effect the current NATO military strategy. The Flexible Response Doctrine was no longer a valid NATO strategy before the Treaty was signed. It has been shown that, under the current situation, flexible response defaults to massive retaliation. And as long as the conventional forces are not sustainable and NATO does not have escalation control, flexible response will not be viable.

A concerted effort to upgrade NATO conventional forces or a corresponding decrease in Soviet conventional forces is required in order for flexible response to once again be valid. To accomplish this, NATO needs to leverage emerging technology as a force multiplier in order to maximize the benefit of scarce resources. Each NATO member must decide two things:

what they want from NATO and what they are willing to pay for it.

The INF Treaty has refocused NATO attention on two long-standing concerns: the applicability of the current strategy, and US - Western Europe linkage. These issues need to be resolved at the highest levels within NATO.

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